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1. The concept of supervenience
Over  the  last  decades,  the  concept  of  supervenience  has  gained  increasing
attention  in  several  fields  of  philosophical  inquiry.  Generally  speaking,  a
template for supervenience is:
A  set  of  properties  (B-properties)  supervene  upon  another  set  of
properties  (A-properties)  if  no  two  possible  things  can  differ  with
respect to their B-properties without also differing with respect to their
A-properties.1
Furthermore, supervenience is usually implicitly considered as a one-sided
dependence relation, according to which: 
a set of properties B supervenes upon another set of properties A, if the
two systems are in a relationship such that there cannot be changes in
the supervenient set B without changes in set A, while there can be
changes in A - the basis low-level - without changes in the set B.2
1 Cf. MCLAUGHLIN & BENNETT 2014; CHALMERS 1996, 32 f.
2 Cf. KIM 1998 and 1999. According to JOHANSONN (2002), the concept of supervenience  involves the 
following three requirements: non-entailment requirement (i.e. no properties of the set A can be 
entailed in the set B), indiscernibility requirement (as expressed by the first definition above), 
existential dependence requirement (as expressed by the second definition).
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This rather broad understanding of the concept of supervenience promises to
provide  a  unifying  framework  to  address  and  differentiate  dependence
relations among elementary and higher-order properties.  Given its  unifying
potential, it comes as no surprise that the concept of supervenience has been
adopted in order to define property-relations in such different fields of inquiry
as those concerning the mind-body problem, the origin and the status of moral
properties, and the dependence of modal truths on non-modal truths, etc.
Assuming that the theoretical power of any concept is not only due to its
consistency  on  the  meta-theoretical  level,  but  also  to  its  descriptive  and
explanatory potential for the investigation of concrete phenomena, the aim of
this  issue  of  Metodo was  to  test  the  concept  of  supervenience  in  different
domains of application. Particularly, the aim was to assess the potentials and
the limits of adopting the concept of supervenience in order to provide both a
descriptive  and  an  explanatory  account  of  the  relation  between  different
moments – or different properties – of experience.
The  leading  questions  underlying  this  issue  can  be  considered  in  partial
continuity  with  those  underlying  Metodo’s 2013  issue  on  Naturalism  and
Subjectivity,  which aimed at examining whether and how naturalism can be
considered  to  be  compatible  with  the  irreducible  subjective  character  of
experience. The problems of whether naturalism is a viable option to address
the structures of experience, and of  which kind of naturalism can be suitable to
this aim, re-emerge in several papers collected in this issue in connection with
supervenience  and  with  the  quest  for  a  unifying  framework  to  address
relations  among properties.  Indeed,  one rather  unquestioned assumption in
most  theories  of  supervenience  is  that  basic  or  elementary  properties  are
natural  (or physical)  properties. As we will  see,  several papers in this issue
explicitly address such an assumption.
Besides some general claims that can be made regarding, for instance, the
supervenience  of  moral  properties  upon  physical  properties,  or  the
supervenience of  conscious states upon bodily states,  the current  debate on
supervenience seemed to be in need of further contributions, differently related
to  naturalism.  Particularly,  three  sets  of  problems  seemed  to  require  a
reassessment of naturalism in relation to supervenience:
(1) On  which  basis  can  we  say  that  the  application  of  the  concept  of
supervenience responds to the unifying expectations awakened by the
above mentioned definition? To answer this question, an analysis of the
assumptions  concerning  the  status  of  both  basic  and  higher-order
properties is  required:  in which cases  can we assume that the basic
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properties are well defined in and for themselves, i.e., independently of
the whole to which they belong? Is it always appropriate to conceive of
basic properties as natural or physical ones?
(2) Depending  on the answer to the previous question, one would either
defend a reductionist or a non-reductionist claim concerning higher-
order properties. In what sense can the concept of supervenience be
said to fit one account or the other? Again, can we assume that natural
or physical properties are in all  cases the most elementary ones? Or
does their definition already resort to more complex explanatory and
descriptive levels?
(3) Which is the precise status of the relations the concept of supervenience
is  supposed  to  address?  Is  it  a  matter  of  mereological  or  formal-
ontological co-belonging, or rather a matter of causation?
These sets of problems notably come to the fore when the original framework
in  which  the  debate  on  supervenience  was  formulated  is  compared  with
phenomenological  approaches  to  property-relations.  And,  as  several
contributions in this issue show, both on the formal level of definition and on
the material level of application, the phenomenological method can fruitfully
define a framework against which to reassess the three just mentioned sets of
problems related to supervenience.
Underlying  the  above  listed  problems,  which  become  prominent  once
theories of supervenience are addressed from a phenomenological perspective,
there is one crucial question, which concerns the very meaning of the concept
of supervenience and can be formulated as follows:
Is the concept of supervenience a purely formal concept (pertaining to
the  formal  ontology  of  possible  objects  and  possible  worlds,
independently  of  their  material  properties),  in  itself  neutral  with
respect  to  any  metaphysical  commitments  regarding  the  material
structures  of  reality,  or  does  it  rather  entail  some  material
commitments, e.g., to physicalisms, in which case its pretended formal
character should be reconsidered?
This is  the main question that  should be kept in mind while reading the
following pages.
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2. The contributions in this issue
The contributors in this issue critically assess the implications of applying the
concept of  supervenience to address the mind-body problem (Mc Laughlin,
Zhok, Corabi,  and Forlé),  the fact-values dilemmas (Rinofner-Kreidl  and De
Monticelli), social ontology and philosophy of science (Little), and the methods
of epistemic clarification (Corabi).
Brian McLaughlin approaches  the problem of  the supervenience  of  mental
properties  upon  physical  properties  by  developing  an  analysis  of  Kim’s
‘dilemma for anomalous monism’. This dilemma refers to whether and how
Davidson’s account of supervenience can be said to consistently fit his general
position regarding anomalous monism. After discussing the formal distinction
between weak and strong supervenience,  Kim argues  that,  if  Davidson has
weak supervenience in mind, then his account fails to clarify the dependency
relations  between  mental  and  physical  properties.  Should  he  instead  have
strong supervenience in mind,  he would have to reject anomalous monism.
McLaughlin is not primarily interested in the ad hominem argument concerning
Davidson’s  position.  His  aim  is  rather  to  examine  whether  Kim’s  dilemma
represents  a  challenge for anomalous monism as such.  Reconstructing both
Davidson’s  position  and  Kim’s  objections,  he  argues  that  the  latter’s
formulation actually points to a false dilemma, since anomalous monism shall
be  supplemented  with  the  psychophysical  determination  thesis  of  strong
supervenience.  Yet,  reformulating  both  horns  of  the  dilemma,  McLaughlin
points to another and more serious dilemma for anomalous monism. The real
problem, he argues, is whether anomalous monism can be supplemented by
supervenience  in  such a  way that  makes  it  capable  to  capture  how mental
properties are dependent on and determined by physical properties, without
collapsing into a dual aspect theory of propositional attitudes.
Andrea Zhok  also develops his  analysis  of  supervenience in relation to the
mind-body  problem.  Beginning  with  a  discussion  of  Davidson's view  on
supervenience and anomalous monism, Zhok argues that the understanding of
‘monism’  as  equivalent  to  physicalism is  not  the  only  one at  our  disposal.
Rather, a Spinozistic understanding of monism seems to be more apt to define
the  framework  in  which  mental  states  can  be  plausibly  considered  to  be
dependent on bodily/material states, without being causally reducible to those
states.  Within  this  framework,  supervenience  should  in  principle  express
ontological dependence without implying any reduction. However, proceeding
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in the examination of the concept of supervenience, Zhok eventually argues
that this concept and the associated theoretical framework are not suitable to
give  a  proper  account  of  one essential  feature  of  consciousness,  namely its
efficaciousness in the material world.
Sonja  Rinofner-Kreidl’s  contribution  focuses  on  moral  supervenience.
Adopting  the  phenomenological  method  of  inquiry,  the  author  critically
addresses the question of whether and how the concept of supervenience can
be adopted to define the status of moral properties, or, to better say, of complex
intentional unities that entail moral properties, such as evaluative moral acts
and their contents. Despite recognizing the role theories of supervenience have
played in trying to cope with the ‘queerness’ of moral properties, after testing
the  descriptive  accuracy  of  Audi’s  theory  of  moral  supervenience,  she
ultimately  rejects  this  view.  Notably,  she  contends  that  the  supervenience
theory,  which assumes  the  idea  of  ‘anchoring’  moral  properties  on  natural
properties, is based on a taken-for-granted and questionable view of  natural
properties. These are assumed as the already given basis upon which moral
properties  are  anchored,  or  added  up.  Yet,  as  Rinofner-Kreidl  shows  by
discussing the situation-related meaning of any moral act, natural properties
simply  cannot  be  taken  for  granted  and  assumed  independently  of  their
contextual  significance.  Thus,  what  is  primarily  problematic  in  the  idea  of
moral supervenience is the general assumption concerning the status of  both
moral and natural properties, and this has an impact on the understanding of
the complexity of the relevant situation. The alternative proposal the author
develops  is  based  on  Husserl’s  account  of  mereological  foundation,  and
notably on the application of the related formal ontological laws to evaluative
acts and morally relevant situations. Resorting to the formal ontological laws of
mereological  foundation  and  connecting  these  laws  to  the  idea  of  rational
interrelation or interweaving of the layers of conscious life allows the author to
avoid the circularity deriving from the unquestioned assumptions concerning
natural  properties,  and to reassess the complexity of the ethical meaning of
situations.
Daniel Little discusses the appropriateness of the concept of supervenience for
the description of the relation between individuals and the social realm. In at
least  partial  convergence  with  Rinofner-Kreidl,  he  introduces  his  central
question by  emphasizing  that  one  of  the  main  problems  in  theories  of
supervenience is that of avoiding misinterpretations concerning the status of
basic  properties.  Subsequently,  he proceeds in the  attempt of  formulating a
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definition of supervenience that could be suitable in order to account for the
relation between individuals and society. Different from both reductionism and
emergence, supervenience seems to define a mid-way to understand property-
relations. Little discusses the reasons that justify the scepticism concerning the
applicability  of  such  a  concept  of  supervenience  to  several  domains  (for
instance to describe the relation between physical  and chemical  properties).
Yet, his main concern is to show why supervenience is ultimately not apt to
properly address the relation between individuals and society. Supervenience
describes an identity relation, and adopting it to characterize the social world
would  prevent  us  from  recognizing  genuine  social  properties,  i.e.,  those
properties that are not simply derivable from individuals and their junction. In
conclusion, appealing to Fodor, he puts forward an alternative view in order to
explain the nature of social properties: the “relative explanatory autonomy”.
According to such a view, social properties shall not be investigated by recourse
to lower-level properties, but rather by considering the explanatory autonomy
of the so-called ‘meso-level’ of explanation.
Francesca Forlé’s paper aims to distinguish what can be legitimately taken as
the supervenience base for cognition from the mere external causes thereof.
Particularly, she addresses this distinction by critically assessing the argument
made by Adam and Aizawa in order to support ‘intracranialism’ as opposed to
the thesis of ‘transcranialism’ defended by both Noë and Chalmers/Clark. The
author  does  not  wish to  defend the  transcranialist  thesis.  Her  argument  is
rather  aimed  at  showing  the  internal  difficulties  in  Adam  and  Aizawa
supervenience  account  of  cognition.  The  main  difficulty  she  addresses
concerns the claim that basic elements of cognition need to be non-derived
representations, and that these can only be neural representations. Following
such a claim, the supervenience base for cognition would coincide with neural
representations.  Forlé  suggests  that  this  premise  in  Adam  and  Aizawa’s
argument does not hold, as it relies on an inadequate understanding of the
naturalization of knowledge. Although the author does not reject the project of
naturalizing  mental  processes,  and  notably  cognition,  she  argues  that  such
naturalization can only be consistent if it does not neglect the subjective basis
of cognition. This seems to imply that a constitution based approach to the
complexity of cognition shall be considered as superior to the supervenience
based account,  precisely  due to the misleading assumptions underlying the
idea of neural-representation base of cognition.
Joseph Corabi also addresses the use of supervenience in relation to the mind-
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body problem, yet with a marked epistemological concern. More precisely, he
discusses how the notion of supervenience can clarify the problem of mental
causation also within an evolutionary framework. Corabi aims to show that the
conceptual apparatus based on supervenience allows a more solid clarification
of  the  evolutionary  argument  against  epiphenomenalism  than  the  one
provided  by  William  James.  To  this  aim,  he  resorts  to  Bayes’  probability
framework,  as a model of  reasoning that is  able to integrate new empirical
evidence within an already established conceptual base. It may seem that, if
one re-frames the distinction of the three main available positions regarding
the mind-body problem (physicalism, interactionism, and epiphenomenalism)
against the background proposed by the author, one would arrive at defending
the monistic interpretation of physicalism. Yet, the author suggests that this
conclusion only holds if we take supervenience as a metaphysical relation, but
not if we assume it as a pure epistemic relation.
Roberta de Monticelli,  in the article published for the section “The Paths of
Method”, addresses the potentials of the phenomenological method in order to
address  the  status  of  values  and  normativity.  Her  methodological  paper
perfectly  suits  the  overall  topic  of  this  issue,  in  that  it  begins  by inquiring
alternative views concerning values or axiological properties, which are at least
in  part  addressed  by  what  she  calls  the  “supervenience  dilemma”.  She
distinguishes  four  ways  of  understanding  the  relation  between  natural  and
axiological  properties,  or  the  relation  between  facts  and  values:  1)  non-
cognitivism;  2)  naturalistic  realism;  3)  anti-naturalistic  realism;  4)
constructivism.  Her  aim  is  to  pinpoint  a  fifth  and  more  viable  option  to
understand that relation, which is made accessible by the phenomenological
method  with  its  systematic  epistemological  reassessment  of  the  role  of
experience  and  intuition.  According  to  De  Monticelli,  the  essence  of  the
phenomenological  method  is  grasped  by  the  following  statement:  “No
theoretical problem about a type of thing S should be addressed but in the
intuitive  presence of  some token or  instance  of  S”.  Elaborating on such an
understanding of the phenomenological method, notably in relation with the
phenomenon  of  ‘grasping  a  Gestalt’  (e.g., in  expressive  phenomena),  she
argues that values have a place in a world of facts. This means that values - not
only moral, but also aesthetic values - have a specific reality, which correlates to
specific modes of apprehension. Accordingly, values are novel properties of the
whole, which inform and individuate its founding parts. Eventually, such an
approach allows her to reject queerness and dualism with regard to the fact-
value relation, and nevertheless to claim that values are objective, given in and
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through experience, intrinsically normative, and ideal.
3. Supervenience and Husserl's mereological foundation
In this last section, we would like to return to the question we phrased at the
beginning.  That  question  concerned  the  formal  or  rather  material  status  of
supervenience  relations,  and  the  possible  underlying  metaphysical
commitments implied in theories of supervenience. As different contributions
in this  issue indicate,  our  question expresses  the  core  of  the  problems that
advocates of supervenience are called to address when it comes to apply the
concept to the theory of experience.
In different ways, all articles published in this issue show that theories of
supervenience do not address property-relations only from the point of view of
formal ontology, and that they are not metaphysically neutral. Rinofner-Kreidl
and De Monticelli,  moreover,  explicitly resort to the framework of Husserl’s
theory of foundational relations, developed in his Third Logical Investigation,3 in
order to bring to the fore some of the assumptions that make supervenience
different from a formal ontological law. In order to pave the way for a possible
phenomenological reassessment of supervenience, we wish now to expand on
the similarities and differences between the concept of supervenience and the
phenomenological  account  of  “mereological  foundation”,  as  Rinofner-Kreidl
labels it.
The phenomenological concept of foundation is formalized by Husserl as an
integral  part  of  his  theory of  wholes  and parts.  Unlike  classical  mereology,
Husserl’s  theory  expresses  the  throughout  holistic  position  that  the  global
properties of a system as a whole can modify the properties and the behavior
of  its  constituents  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  either  ontologically  or
epistemologically  explained  by  remaining  confined  to  the  analysis  of  the
constituents’ properties (i.e., of those properties that should be considered as
‘more basic’ if one endorses the supervenience framework).
The concept of supervenience is comparable with one of the two essential
types  of  wholes  (and  correspondent  parts)  pinned  down  by  Husserl’s
definition  of  unitary  foundation  in  §21  of  the  Third  Logical  Investigation.4
3 HUSSERL 1984, 227 f.
4 HUSSERL 2001, 34-35. We translate the adjective einheitlich of the syntagm einhetliche Fundierung with
unitary following Giovanni Piana’s Italian translation (cf. PIANA 1968) and not Findlay’s English one
(i.e. HUSSERL 2001). The latter prefers the term single and its cognate singleness (Einheitlichkeit) in the
first branch of the definition of the foundation, while in the second branch (as well as in the entire
§22!) he inconsistently opts for unitary. Since in Husserl’s definition of foundation two different forms
of bounds of unity among parts rather than the singleness of the whole is at stake, Findlay’s translation
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Husserl’s  understanding  of  ontological  foundation  can  be  regarded  as  a
stronger  version  of  the  one-sided  dependence  relation  mentioned  above,
according to which a content of the type B is founded upon a content of the
type A,
if a B can by its essence (i.e. legally, in virtue of its specific nature) not
exist, unless an A also exists. 5
A unitary foundation is a specific form of foundation in which “every content
is  foundationally  connected,  whether  directly  or  indirectly,  with  every
content”.6 Conni stresses the fact that Husserl distinguishes two essential types
of  unitary  foundation  and  respectively  two  types  of  wholes  and  founding
parts:7 the unity of the founding set may be founded  either  on a relation of
mutual dependence, reciprocal foundation and interpenetration among all the
parts  of  the  set  A with each other,  or  on the  unitary foundation of  a  new
content with a new set of global properties B founded on the plurality of the
independent parts of the set A, and on all of them together.8 In the following
formalisation, we refer exclusively to this second type of unitary foundation.
The contrast between this account of unitary foundation and the concept of
supervenience relies on the formal ontological framework adopted to describe
the type of bounds that unify individual properties of a set A (properties of the
founding independent parts). Accordingly:
is not only unfaithful to the German term (single would be einzig or einsam, not einheitlich) but, even
worse, conceptually wrong. Then Husserl (in Findlay’s own translation of §22) considers “unity”
(Einheit) as a “categorial predicate” (HUSSERL 2001, 37) and “the relations of ‘foundations’” as “the
only true unifying factors” (HUSSERL 2001, 36).
5 HUSSERL 2001, 34.
6 HUSSERL 2001, 34.
7 This distinction seems to have passed mostly unnoticed in the English literature. In fact, Findlay’s
translation completely omits the adverb umgekehrt  (conversely) that stresses the logical disjunction
between these two kind of foundations. Given the relevance of the following passage let’s quote it
extensively following Conni’s layout that graphically underlines the essential distinction between
two different Definitions of Unitary Foundation (DUF) (CONNI 2005, 81): DUF1: “By a Whole we
understand a range of contents which are all covered by a [unitary] foundation without the help of
further contents. The contents of such a range we call its parts. Talk of the [unity] of the foundation
implies that  every content is foundationally connected, whether directly or indirectly, with every content.
This can happen in that all these contents are immediately or mediately founded on each other
without  external  assistance[;  DUF2:] or  [conversely],  in  that  [all  together]  serve  to  found  a  new
content, again without external assistance. In the latter case the possibility remains open that this
unitary content is built up out of partial contents, which in their turn are founded on partial groups
from the presupposed range of contents, just as the Whole content is founded on its total range.”
(our translation, based on HUSSERL 2001, 34; quoted following CONNI 2005, 80-81).
8 Accordingly, Conni defines the first essential type of whole ‘pregnant structure’ and the second type
‘emergent structure’.
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i. a new set of global properties B emerges (bottom-up) and
ii. the  founding  individual  properties  of  the  set  A  are  themselves
disposed according to the founded whole (described by the set B) in
such a way that they become individualized (top-down) through
iii. new individual properties C that are founded on the unifying moments
in the founding parts of the whole (described by the set B). The set of
properties C entails new properties of the founding independent parts,
which are in a relation of reciprocal foundation with the properties of
the set B and which were not properties of the set A.
If supervenience can be described as a bottom-up movement in which a novel
high-level content with a set of properties B is founded by a group of low-level
contents with a set of properties A, the supervenient structure (set B) should
have  – according to Husserl – a retroactive effect on the founding contents (set
A) that found it as new higher-level content: in this foundation there is a kind
of ontological feedback of new global properties (set B) of the supervenient whole
on the founding contents. Accordingly, the latter are individuated top-down by
the content they found.
Whereas the bottom-up movement of this concept of foundation is in line
with  the  concept  of  supervenience,  the  top-down  feedback  of  the  founded
whole on the properties of the founding parts is not. Eventually, the question
that  we  shall  ask  is  the  following:  Can  we  consider  Husserl’s  concept  of
foundation as a formal ontological enrichment of the concept of supervenience
or does the latter exclude any top-down effects of the supervenient properties
as some authors suggest? We will argue that the former is in fact the case.9
Husserl’s  formal  ontological  description  of  this  top-down  feedback  has
interesting consequences for the indiscernibility requirement usually expressed
in the definition of supervenience. Let’s recall it:
A  set  of  properties  (B-properties)  supervenes upon  another  set  of
properties  (A-properties)  if  no  two  possible  things  can  differ  with
respect to their B-properties without also differing with respect to their
A-properties.
This definition takes no position on the direction expressed by supervenience
9 It should be noticed that, in order to appreciate such an enrichment, one would have to bracket the
above mentioned metaphysical assumptions in the supervenience framework.  These are implicit
when supervenience is taken to address causal relations. Our attempt here is to be understood in
purely formal ontological terms, i.e, as related to laws that are independent of and presupposed by
material laws (including causality).
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(bottom-up or top-down): it is somehow neutral in this respect. In fact, in the
moral  discourse  of  the  “supervenience  dilemma”,  the  introduction  of  the
concept of supervenience suggests a top-down look, whereas in the mind-body
application of the concept a bottom-up stance is presupposed.
In  maybe  the  first  occurrence  of  the  term  supervenience  in  analytic
philosophy,  the  moral  philosopher  Richard  M.  Hare10 claimed  that,  if  two
persons  are  indiscernible  with  respect  to  natural  properties,  they  are
necessarily indiscernible with respect to moral goodness. Nonetheless, moral
goodness is not entailed by the natural properties through which these persons
and their  actions  can  be  described:  moral  goodness  supervenes  on  natural
properties. Yet, parallel indiscernibility of supervenient moral and other non-
supervenient qualities still  says nothing about either the reduction of moral
properties to natural  properties or the feedback of the former on the latter.
Eventually we could consider the new properties of the founding parts as they
are given in the set C (thanks to their reciprocal foundational relation with the
supervenient  global  properties  B)  as  not  belonging  to  the  supervenient
properties B. This would mean that the set of properties C belongs to a set of
property ‘non-B’, entailing also the set of properties A. The non-B and the B set
would respect the indiscernibility requirement, too. Indeed the properties of
the set C are properties that pertain to parts of the whole, just because they are
individuated by the whole as parts of this whole. But, as both De Monticelli and
Rinofner-Kreidl argue, a phenomenological concept of foundation articulates
precisely these laws of dependence among the sets A, B and C, which allows us
to even question the self-evident character of the claim that all non-B properties
are basic, natural, and intrinsically defined. In fact, the set non-B is, according
to the account of mereological foundation, already entangled with a reciprocal
foundation with B.  Therefore, if one stays with the implicit presupposition of
the supervenience debate,  i.e.,  that the non-supervenient properties are in a
one-sided bottom-up dependence with the supervenient ones, and conflates set
A with set C, then the concept of supervenience would contradict the account
of  mereological  foundation:  the  set  of  properties  A  would  be  implicitly
considered as A = non-B and therefore entailing the set of properties C.11
According to the above mentioned definition of one-sided dependence,
10 HARE 1952.
11 Actually,  this  conflation  would  contradict  the  concept  of  supervenience  itself,  since  it  would
partially contravene the requirement of non-entailment (i.e properties of the supervenient structures
cannot be entailed in the founding one): if the properties of the set C, as bilaterally founded on B,
would be considered as part of A,  then some of the properties depending on the supervenient
structure would be entailed in the founding one.
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a set of properties B supervenes upon another set of properties A, if the
two systems are in a relationship such as there cannot be changes in the
supervenient set B without changes in set A, while there can be changes
in A - the basis low-level - without changes in the set B.
In principle, top-down effects of the set of properties B on the founding set A
would not  contradict  this  definition.  If  supervenience  involves  only  parallel
indiscernibility  and  existential  dependence,  mereological  foundation  could
eventually be considered as compatible with it, if, and only if, supervenience
would admit the possibility of a kind of ontological feedback. Be that at it may,
only the concept of mereological foundation can provide a description of this
retroactive ontological relation.
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